Q1: Popper draws the distinction between reduction and emergence: the one reduces things to preexisting knowledge or systems of knowledge and the other asserts that the two are different. Is this a reductionist distinction to draw? Doesn't the label 'emergent' subjugate emergent objects or ideas to Popper's dichotomous system, 'reducing' them to features of another structure of logic? What does it mean to have a framework for dealing with things whose distinguishing characteristic is that they cannot be reduced to familiar frames? Is there a third axis along which we can think? It seems like reduction/emergence, as a linguistic construct, aches to be settled in favor of one or the other, reducing life to physics or emerging it to something completely inexplicable (and physics along with it). Is there something else? What would it look like?
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Q2: For some reason, I had a difficult time with this reading, even though it seemed to be easier than the previous readings. I guess my main problem is all the notation he uses to describe how problems result, how to solve problems, grammar things, etc. I just don't quite understand how the abbreviations are being used and what they mean when they are being used. Also, I'm not even sure if I understood the overall arguments he was making. What were his main points besides the fact that meaning should not be utilized in making judgements/stating facts (also, was that even his idea or someone else's idea he was explaining?)
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Q3: Why is the reduction from chemistry (or biology) to physics so important? I don’t quite understand what is so spectacular about reducing one of these subjects to physics. Why is it a scientific success to be able to explain everything in chemistry/biology with physics? Is it because it shows that then chemistry and physics are closer to being "true"?
What exactly is Popper referring to when he talks about ad hoc reductions?
Intuitionist logic tries to prove as many mathematical theorems as possible with reduced logical means, but how is it different from classical logic? What is classical logic?
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Q4: Where does the boundary lie between "chemistry" and "physics"? Aren't these simply arbitrary categories constructed by humans? Popper claims that it's conceivable that one day, biology will be reduced to physics, but where does that get us, how does reducing various branches of science to physics give us knowledge?
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Q5: What is the exact difference between reduction and emergence? If something emerges from something else, does that mean it will or won't be reducible to the original thing? If chemistry reduces to physics, what is something that emerged from physics?
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Q6: As humans, we can never prove a theory to be correct, only prove it to be wrong. If we keep trying to disprove it but it stands our toughest tests, then it is considered "higly likely" to be true. Does this mean we should not ask what "truth" is and accept that it is somehow connected to fact?
Also (on a side note) what is the "blade" theory he kept talking about? I'm a tad confused on it.
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Q7: Popper says "One should never get involved in verbal questions or questions of meaning, and never get interested in words." However, if you never get involved in questions of meaning, how can you be sure that somebody understands what you mean? Two people may have a completely different understanding of the same word (for whatever reason), which could lead to a difference in the truth of a statement. Or is Popper assuming that in general, people are going to understand the words to mean essentially the same thing?
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Q8: Is Popper saying that reduction should be the ultimate goal? It would be very helpful and would greatly expand our knowledge of the world if it were possible to simply reduce, for example, chemistry down to physics. We would probably even gain a bit of understanding if it was less than simply, but I don't think it should be forced or strived at meticulously. He mentions that biology would probably be very difficult or complex to reduce to physics, but it might be possible. Should we be trying to reduce things if they don't want to relatively easily warrant reduction? It seems like that would lead to lots of problems or obscure, unpractical theories. How much knowledge is gained? Should knowledge be relatively simple or useful?
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Q9: I'm wondering about Popper's various equations involving TT and EE etc. If we follow this scheme, where a problem goes to theory goes to examination goes to problem, couldn't you just expand and keep going with more problems and theories? If by doing so, do you get further and further away from your original problem, and more importantly your original theory? It seems like this would make complex knowledge extremely unrealiable, and more unreliable the more comlex it gets, since it would be based on theory after theory. Is this the case? Or does the EE (error elimination) wipe out the error?
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Q10: Why does Popper view reduction as such a great advancement in knowledge?
What exactly is Popper's argument against the equation "to be = to be perceived?" How does the "realization" that "all observation involves interpretation in light of theories" reject the equation?
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